Session
Organizer 1: James Shires, European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI)
Organizer 2: Anni Adamson, European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative
Organizer 3: Hurel Louise Marie, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Speaker 1: James Shires, Civil Society, Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
Speaker 2: Bassant Hassib, Civil Society, African Group
Speaker 3: Yasmine Idrissi Azzouzi, Intergovernmental Organization, Intergovernmental Organization
Speaker 4: Erik Kursetgjerde, Government, Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
Hurel Louise Marie, Civil Society, Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
Anni Adamson, Civil Society, Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
James Shires, Civil Society, Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
Roundtable
Duration (minutes): 90
Format description: The roundtable format has been chosen for its inclusive nature. It ensures a diverse range of perspectives, encourages open dialogue, and allows for collective problem-solving, making it ideal for addressing multifaceted issues like the paradox of inclusion. This is especially crucial because many of the participants will have experienced the paradox of inclusion themselves. The roundtable format equalizes the session experience, enabling speakers to intervene from a position among peers, and participants to avoid unnecessary physical boundaries and restrictions. The 90-minute session time, featuring four speakers as well as moderators, offers an ideal platform for exploring the topic while ensuring ample time for speaker contributions and audience engagement, fostering a balanced dialogue. The focused discussion over the longest session duration available is necessary to detail the changing landscape of Internet governance, including developing a comprehensive map of governance modalities and enhanced alignment with the vision of the Internet We Want.
A. What are the main areas of overlap and potential duplication between various Internet governance modes and sites emerging 2024-2026, and how do they contribute to or mitigate the paradox of inclusion? B. What are the main gaps in this changing Internet governance landscape, and how can the Internet governance community work now to prevent these gaps from affecting the overall success of new initiatives and processes? C. What is the relationship between new Internet governance institutions and the Internet We Want - how will these institutions help us get there, and what are the main obstacles along the way?
What will participants gain from attending this session? Participants will obtain new knowledge about the range of governance modes and sites that are emerging in 2024, 2025, and 2026, especially around the increased risk of a paradox of inclusion due to these new sites. They will be able to contribute to and draw upon the map developed by the session and use this map to inform others and enhance post-IGF discussions in their organizations and networks about how best to contribute to these different governance modes. Participants will also develop insights into the significant gaps in new modes of governance, enabling them to work to limit gaps in existing processes and begin new initiatives to fill these gaps. Through the immediate self-reflection section, participants will also develop a greater understanding of the biases and limitations of their default approaches to the questions discussed, enabling them to adopt more inclusive and open approaches in the future.
Description:
Global internet governance is at a turning point. WSIS+20 events in 2025 will provide an opportunity for reform as well as reflection; it is still uncertain whether the Global Digital Compact (GDC), to be agreed on during a Summit of the Future in September, will create additional fora for internet governance topics; the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) will conclude in 2025, with the content of a subsequent Programme of Action (POA) and potential additional modalities still under discussion; added to uncertainty around the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee on cybercrime. This workshop, held under IGF sub-theme 4, “Improving digital governance for the Internet We Want”, will address the rapidly increasing range of institutions, sites, and modes of Internet governance. Its central purpose is to examine what some have called a “paradox of inclusion”, where the sheer range of initiatives overwhelms the ability of low-resourced actors, such as developing countries and civil society, to meaningfully contribute. After an overview of the likely trajectory of internet governance in 2025-2026, the workshop will focus on areas of overlap and potential duplication, including challenges to the authority and constitution of technical internet governance bodies, as well as normative disagreements present across the more policy-oriented fora above. The workshop will also examine potential gaps in the emerging internet governance landscape, such as global digital inequality along gender and other intersectional lines and material resource scarcities. This workshop will adopt innovative methods to crowd-source views from participants, as well as immediate self-reflection to identify potential biases. The concrete result of this workshop will be a publicly available map of internet governance institutions as a shared resource for the Internet governance community. This map will include institution mandates, main backers, and key areas of potential challenge, contestation, and duplication.
There are two expected outcomes from this session: First, greater clarity on the paradox of inclusion. The workshop will produce a publicly available map of internet governance modalities, their scope, and their pros and cons, developed directly from the workshop's discussions. While there are many excellent existing resources on these processes, these resources rarely directly compare the advantages and disadvantages of each modality or their overall gaps. Second, greater connection between new internet governance institutions and the Internet We Want. By anchoring the workshop discussions in current articulations of the Internet We Want, a key outcome is strengthening participants’ understanding of the Internet We Want as a connective tissue between often disparate policy discussions in different fora. Also, because the Internet We Want is a bottom-up and ongoing vision, the self-reflection section of this session takes this commitment seriously by immediately analyzing potential bias in the workshop outcomes.
Hybrid Format: All speakers will participate in pre-session briefings together, to share questions and key talking points and ensure speaking times are evenly weighted between online and offline speakers. The onsite and online moderators will curate the speaker order and moderator interventions to ensure a coherent flow and seamless transition between speakers for online and onsite participants. The moderators will use freely available online tools to increase active participation, such as Slido or Mentimeter, or native integrations for major platforms. The final self-reflection section will use an interactive presentation of common biases in pictorial form and ask individuals to associate those biases with particular moments in the session, enabling online and onsite participants to take part equally. Crucially, this section will avoid potential individual discomfort through clear ground rules detailed at the start and reiterated and enforced by both moderators throughout, including no comments directed at individuals or inappropriate language.
Report
The paradox of inclusion (defined as more efforts to include stakeholders overwhelm the very under-resourced stakeholders that already struggle to participate) comes from both specialization and politicization of internet governance processes. Lack of ownership can stem from both deliberate delaying tactics and assumptions about "relevant" states or other stakeholders. The only way to effectively dilute ownership is for some to relinquish control
Siloes at the national level are replicated at the international level, with inter-agency divisions of responsibility and lack of skills/knowledge filtering into multilateral internet governance processes.
States can "reverse engineeer" efforts at inclusion, especially when it is opposed to their interests, by moving between national and international levels, introducing ideas rejected at one level into the other level.
Reinforce the importance of intra-state coordination for effective participation in international processes, including a special focus on minoritized groups.
Invite contributions along clear parameters with transparent deadlines and expectations. After deadlines have passed, look to spread responsibility for delivery/progress among a diverse group.
The paradox of inclusion in internet governance - session report
The speakers for this session were slightly changed from the session proposal: James Shires and Yasmine Azzouzi were joined in person by Corinne Casha, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Malta, and online by Louise Marie Hurel, from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Erik Kursetgjerde was unfortunately not able to participate, and the session was moderated by James Shires.
James Shires opened the session by welcoming the other panelists and the audience. He then set out the aims of the session by defining the “paradox of inclusion”, where the sheer range of internet governance initiatives overwhelms the ability of low-resourced actors, such as developing countries and civil society, to meaningfully contribute. This paradox is exacerbated by the rapidly increasing range of institutions, sites, and modes of Internet governance.
The speakers’ remarks traced the paradox of inclusion to two related phenomena: first, an understandable specialization within internet governance, leading to separate venues and conversations for distinct topics; and, second, a political strategy to foster like-mindedness and/or purposefully fragment some of the ongoing cybersecurity debates. These remarks then highlighted key moments leading to the paradox of inclusion at a state level, especially at the UN Open Ended Working Group (OEWG). The OEWG transition enabled a discussion on state responsibility in cyberspace that now structurally included 193 countries. Effective participation, however, required more efforts such as the women in cyber fellowship for diplomats. Enabling participation and representation from a process design standpoint is important but there are structural UN/diplomatic issues that still make it challenging for us to think about meaningful inclusion. For example, limited UN mission resources for developing and small states and costly/resource intensive commitment to bring cyber expertise from capitals (especially if it means doing so 3 times or more per calendar year).
The speakers’ remarks also focused on non-governmental stakeholders. In the OEWG, unlike the previous GGE, non-governmental entities are allowed to register. However, modalities for stakeholder participation were weaponized for political purposes, while such politicization was mitigated by the chair, who held virtual intersessional meetings to gather stakeholder input. Despite such efforts, the current geopolitical context is not favourable for more inclusivity—especially non-state—in whatever process comes next. Some speakers highlighted a “paradox of meaningful leadership”: if states are spearheading theme-specific initiatives (i.e. Counter-Ransomware Initiative, Pall Mall Process etc) then they need to consider how to calibrate control and delegation of agency if these processes are to be sustainable or inclusive. This also requires a calibration of political risks (from the initiators) and acceptance that processes might take a different course once mainstreamed/delegated from that originally intended. This also requires meaningful coordination and dialogue: for example, states might say that they are facilitating or supportive of a more inclusive (state and non-state) dialogue, but are they truly open to productive disagreement and/or open to other experts’ input?
The session then turned to questions and discussion. Most questions agreed with the speakers that this is a pivotal moment for global internet governance. As we approach WSIS+20 in 2025 and navigate the complexities of frameworks like the Global Digital Compact (GDC), as well as topic-specific ones like for cybersecurity, the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICT Security, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime, we are witnessing a proliferation of governance fora that present both opportunities and challenges. They also agreed with the speakers that that the paradox of inclusion comes from overlapping topics, and the silos present at the national level reflect those seen internationally. Digital issues touch on multiple disciplines—spanning national security, economic development, human rights, and sociological change. This interdisciplinarity, while enriching, also contributes to fragmentation. Compartmentalization makes it challenging for stakeholders, particularly from low-resourced nations, to align their priorities and maintain continuity across discussions.
Speakers responded to these questions with specific examples. For example, Yasmine noted that agreements and resolutions reached during ITU statutory meetings on cyber capacity building are often also discussed under the OEWG’s agenda item on cyber capacity-building. This is partly due to state representation at ITU being Ministries of ICTs, while OEWG first committee representation are diplomats or representatives of national cyber agencies. James explained how the Pall Mall Processes sacrifices some level of precision and specificity in favour of a “big-tent” approach to the governance of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities.
Speakers then put forward recommendations to address the paradox of inclusion. First, states should establish multidisciplinary teams that bring together experts from technical, diplomatic, and policymaking communities. For instance, the representation of national cyber agencies or national CIRTs at the OEWG often results in more practical, context-specific interventions compared to traditional career diplomats. Second, capacity building initiatives should prioritize inclusivity that bridges technical and policy silos. Programs should focus on enabling countries to engage in internet governance fora holistically—equipped with both technical knowledge and policy acumen. Third, the UN should streamline processes. While it is not realistic or useful to think of consolidating all internet governance fora, we can enhance coordination and avoid duplication by aligning mandates and creating better linkages between discussions. For instance, capacity-building agendas could be harmonized across the OEWG, ITU, and the GDC to reduce redundancy and maximize impact. Fourth, and finally, states should incentivize interagency collaboration across technical, diplomatic, and policy communities. This can include having coordination mechanisms in place that regularly consult across disciplines and ensure consistency in international negotiations.
The session concluded with some overarching themes and next steps. Speakers and attendees should work to reduce and align areas of overlap and potential duplication, including challenges to the authority and constitution of technical internet governance bodies, as well as normative disagreements present across more policy-oriented fora. We should also examine in more detail potential gaps in the emerging internet governance landscape, such as global digital inequality along gender and other intersectional lines and material resource scarcities